new feature: transaction interruption for same intent replacement

libs/agent_framework/build/lib/agent_framework/guardrails/dlex_sanitizer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+"""Deterministic, framework-owned sanitization for DLEX_OUT.
+
+The DLEX classifier decides whether a candidate response contains information
+that must not be exposed.  When the finding is recoverable, this module masks
+only the sensitive values so the response can be revalidated and preserved.
+
+Rules are intentionally generic and live in the framework, never in domain
+agents. Deployments may extend the built-ins without changing agent code via:
+
+* ``GUARDRAIL_DLEX_OUT_EXTRA_MASKS_JSON`` (JSON list of rule objects), or
+* the DLEX_OUT rail policy key ``sanitize_patterns`` in guardrails.yaml.
+
+Each extension rule accepts ``name``, ``pattern`` and ``replacement``. Patterns
+are regular expressions. Raw matched values are never returned in findings.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from typing import Any, Iterable
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class DlexMaskRule:
+    name: str
+    pattern: str
+    replacement: str
+    flags: int = re.IGNORECASE
+
+
+# Conservative defaults: values that are broadly unsafe to echo verbatim and
+# can be redacted without changing the semantic meaning of an answer.
+_BUILTIN_RULES: tuple[DlexMaskRule, ...] = (
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "payment_barcode",
+        # Brazilian boleto/payment representations normally contain 44, 47 or
+        # 48 digits and may be formatted with dots/spaces. Keep the match on the
+        # numeric token only so surrounding prose is preserved.
+        r"(?<!\d)(?=[0-9.\-\s]{44,90}(?!\d))(?:\d[.\-\s]*){44,48}(?!\d)",
+        "[CODIGO_DE_PAGAMENTO_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "jwt",
+        r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b",
+        "[TOKEN_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "openai_style_secret",
+        r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b",
+        "[CREDENCIAL_OCULTADA]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "labelled_secret",
+        r"(?i)\b(api[_ -]?key|secret|segredo|token|senha|password|credential|credencial)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)([^\s,;]+)",
+        r"\1\2[DADO_PROTEGIDO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "cpf",
+        r"\b\d{3}\.\d{3}\.\d{3}-\d{2}\b",
+        "[CPF_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "cnpj",
+        r"\b\d{2}\.\d{3}\.\d{3}/\d{4}-\d{2}\b",
+        "[CNPJ_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "email",
+        r"\b[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b",
+        "[EMAIL_OCULTADO]",
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "labelled_phone",
+        r"(?i)\b(telefone|celular|whatsapp|msisdn)\b(\s*[:=]?\s*)(?:\+?55\s*)?(?:\(?\d{2}\)?[\s.-]*)?\d{4,5}[\s.-]*\d{4}\b",
+        r"\1\2[TELEFONE_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "uuid",
+        r"\b[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[89abAB][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}\b",
+        "[IDENTIFICADOR_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def _parse_rule(raw: Any) -> DlexMaskRule | None:
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return None
+    name = str(raw.get("name") or "custom").strip()
+    pattern = str(raw.get("pattern") or "").strip()
+    replacement = str(raw.get("replacement") or "[DADO_PROTEGIDO]")
+    if not pattern:
+        return None
+    try:
+        re.compile(pattern)
+    except re.error:
+        return None
+    return DlexMaskRule(name=name, pattern=pattern, replacement=replacement, flags=0)
+
+
+def _extra_rules_from_env() -> list[DlexMaskRule]:
+    raw = os.getenv("GUARDRAIL_DLEX_OUT_EXTRA_MASKS_JSON", "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return []
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(raw)
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+    if isinstance(data, dict):
+        data = [data]
+    return [rule for item in (data or []) if (rule := _parse_rule(item)) is not None]
+
+
+def _extra_rules_from_policy(policy: dict[str, Any] | None) -> list[DlexMaskRule]:
+    data = dict(policy or {}).get("sanitize_patterns") or []
+    if isinstance(data, dict):
+        data = [data]
+    return [rule for item in data if (rule := _parse_rule(item)) is not None]
+
+
+def _mask_payment_sequences(text: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    """Mask 44/47/48-digit payment tokens without consuming surrounding prose.
+
+    Regex alone is awkward because formatted boletos have variable punctuation.
+    We scan numeric/punctuation runs, count digits, and only redact the run when
+    it has a canonical payment digit count.
+    """
+    token_re = re.compile(r"(?<!\d)\d(?:[.\-\s]*\d){43,47}(?!\d)")
+    count = 0
+
+    def repl(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
+        nonlocal count
+        token = match.group(0)
+        digits = re.sub(r"\D", "", token)
+        if len(digits) in {44, 47, 48}:
+            count += 1
+            return "[CODIGO_DE_PAGAMENTO_OCULTADO]"
+        return token
+
+    return token_re.sub(repl, text), count
+
+
+def sanitize_dlex_output(
+    text: str,
+    *,
+    policy: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    exclude_values: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]:
+    """Return ``(sanitized_text, findings)`` without exposing raw matches.
+
+    ``exclude_values`` contains explicitly authorized values (for example a
+    workflow-generated protocol). They are temporarily protected so generic
+    masking never alters them.
+    """
+    original = text or ""
+    sanitized = original
+    findings: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    protected: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for index, value in enumerate(exclude_values or []):
+        value = str(value or "").strip()
+        if not value or value not in sanitized:
+            continue
+        marker = f"__DLEX_AUTHORIZED_{index}__"
+        sanitized = sanitized.replace(value, marker)
+        protected[marker] = value
+
+    # Payment sequences use digit-count validation rather than a plain rule.
+    sanitized, payment_count = _mask_payment_sequences(sanitized)
+    if payment_count:
+        findings.append({"type": "payment_barcode", "action": "redact", "count": payment_count})
+
+    rules = [r for r in _BUILTIN_RULES if r.name != "payment_barcode"]
+    rules.extend(_extra_rules_from_env())
+    rules.extend(_extra_rules_from_policy(policy))
+
+    for rule in rules:
+        try:
+            regex = re.compile(rule.pattern, rule.flags)
+        except re.error:
+            continue
+        sanitized, count = regex.subn(rule.replacement, sanitized)
+        if count:
+            findings.append({"type": rule.name, "action": "redact", "count": count})
+
+    for marker, value in protected.items():
+        sanitized = sanitized.replace(marker, value)
+
+    return sanitized, findings
+
+
+__all__ = ["DlexMaskRule", "sanitize_dlex_output"]

libs/agent_framework/build/lib/agent_framework/guardrails/rails.py

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from .calibrated.output_sanitization import mascarar_pii_output, sanitizar_toxic
 from .calibrated.rules.pinj_patterns import _PINJ_PATTERNS, is_obvious_injection
 from .calibrated.rules.tox_blocklist import _EXPLICIT_TERMS, _THREAT_PATTERNS, is_obvious_toxic
 from .framework_llm_client import classify_with_framework_llm
+from .dlex_sanitizer import sanitize_dlex_output
 from agent_framework.workflows.input_contract import has_meaningful_unmatched_policy, has_semantic_classifier
 
 
@@ -323,10 +324,28 @@ class CoherenceRail(Guardrail):
                     "data": out,
                 },
             )
-        out = await classify_with_framework_llm(
+        try:
-            _llm(ctx), "COER", {"text": text or "", "context": ctx},
+            out = await classify_with_framework_llm(
-            profile_name="guardrail", component_name="guardrail.coer", generation_name="guardrail.coer",
+                _llm(ctx), "COER", {"text": text or "", "context": ctx},
-        )
+                profile_name="guardrail", component_name="guardrail.coer", generation_name="guardrail.coer",
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            # COER is a conversational-coherence rail, not a security boundary.
+            # If its semantic classifier/provider is unavailable, the graph must
+            # continue and let the normal router/workflow clarification logic own
+            # the turn instead of surfacing an infrastructure exception.
+            return RailDecision(
+                code=self.code,
+                allowed=True,
+                reason="Classificador de coerência indisponível; continuidade delegada ao runtime",
+                sanitized_text=text,
+                metadata={
+                    "mechanism": "infrastructure_fail_open",
+                    "calibrated": True,
+                    "error_type": type(exc).__name__,
+                    "error": str(exc)[:500],
+                },
+            )
         return RailDecision(
             code=self.code, allowed=bool(out.get("allowed", True)),
             reason=str(out.get("reason") or out.get("label") or "COER avaliado"),
@@ -344,6 +363,9 @@ class LoopRail(Guardrail):
             "COLLECTING_PARAMETERS", "AWAITING_CONFIRMATION", "EXECUTING",
             "PAUSED", "WAITING_INPUT",
         }
+        # A queued multi-intent transaction may be promoted immediately after
+        # the previous one completed. Prefer the newest live MCP evidence over
+        # a stale top-level COMPLETED status left by checkpoint merge order.
         for result in reversed(list(ctx.get("mcp_results") or [])):
             if isinstance(result, dict):
                 result_status = str(result.get("transaction_status") or "").strip().upper()
@@ -359,6 +381,11 @@ class LoopRail(Guardrail):
     async def evaluate(self, text: str, context: dict[str, Any]) -> RailDecision:
         ctx = _ctx(context)
         transaction_status = self._transaction_status(ctx)
+
+        # Parameter values and short confirmations may legitimately repeat in
+        # the same session. VLOOP must not consume input owned by the active
+        # transaction contract; extraction/confirmation remains responsible
+        # for deciding whether the value is valid.
         if transaction_status in {"COLLECTING_PARAMETERS", "AWAITING_CONFIRMATION"}:
             return RailDecision(
                 code=self.code,
@@ -373,6 +400,7 @@ class LoopRail(Guardrail):
                     "calibrated": True,
                 },
             )
+
         normalized = _lower(text).strip()
         history = [_lower(h).strip() for h in ctx.get("history_texts", [])[-6:]]
         repeated = history.count(normalized) >= 2 if normalized else False
@@ -805,11 +833,64 @@ class DataLeakageOutputRail(Guardrail):
                 }
                 protocol_authorization_verified = True
 
+        # DLEX_OUT is permissive for recoverable leakage: when classification
+        # rejects the candidate, mask only generic sensitive values and re-run
+        # the same classifier. The agent/domain remains unaware of this detail.
+        # If sanitization cannot change the candidate, or the sanitized version
+        # is still unsafe, the original blocking behavior is preserved.
+        dlex_sanitized_text = None
+        dlex_findings: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        sanitization_recheck = None
+        original_dlex_result = dict(out)
+        if not bool(out.get("allowed", True)):
+            policy = dict(getattr(self, "_guardrail_policy", {}) or {})
+            candidate_sanitized, dlex_findings = sanitize_dlex_output(
+                original_text,
+                policy=policy,
+                exclude_values=matched_expected_protocols,
+            )
+            if candidate_sanitized != original_text:
+                sanitized_classifier_text = candidate_sanitized
+                sanitized_classifier_ctx: dict[str, Any] = ctx
+                if matched_expected_protocols:
+                    sanitized_classifier_text = _mask_authorized_protocol_values(
+                        sanitized_classifier_text, matched_expected_protocols
+                    )
+                    sanitized_classifier_ctx = _mask_authorized_protocol_values(
+                        ctx, matched_expected_protocols
+                    )
+                sanitization_recheck = await classify_with_framework_llm(
+                    _llm(ctx),
+                    "DLEX_OUT",
+                    {"text": sanitized_classifier_text, "context": sanitized_classifier_ctx},
+                    profile_name="grl",
+                    component_name="guardrail.dlex_out.sanitization_recheck",
+                    generation_name="guardrail.dlex_out.sanitization_recheck",
+                )
+                if bool(sanitization_recheck.get("allowed", True)):
+                    dlex_sanitized_text = candidate_sanitized
+                    out = {
+                        "allowed": True,
+                        "label": "SANITIZED",
+                        "reason": "DLEX_OUT sanitizado e revalidado com segurança",
+                        "original_reason": original_dlex_result.get("reason"),
+                    }
+
         metadata = {
             "mechanism": "llm_rail",
             "data": out,
             "calibrated": True,
         }
+        if dlex_findings:
+            metadata.update(
+                {
+                    "action": "sanitize" if dlex_sanitized_text is not None else "block",
+                    "sanitized": dlex_sanitized_text is not None,
+                    "findings": dlex_findings,
+                    "original_decision": original_dlex_result,
+                    "sanitization_recheck": sanitization_recheck,
+                }
+            )
         if matched_expected_protocols:
             metadata.update(
                 {
@@ -823,7 +904,7 @@ class DataLeakageOutputRail(Guardrail):
             code=self.code,
             allowed=bool(out.get("allowed", True)),
             reason=str(out.get("reason") or out.get("label") or "DLEX_OUT avaliado"),
-            sanitized_text=text,
+            sanitized_text=dlex_sanitized_text,
             metadata=metadata,
         )
 

libs/agent_framework/build/lib/agent_framework/routing/enterprise_router.py

@@ -1218,7 +1218,17 @@ class EnterpriseRouter:
                 or (started_intent and configured_candidate.intent != started_intent)
                 or (previous_intent and not previous_intent.startswith("state:") and configured_candidate.intent != previous_intent)
             )
-            if not different:
+
+            # A configured candidate that resolves to the same intent/agent is not
+            # sufficient to conclude that the active transaction continues.  The
+            # user may be starting a *new instance of the same intent* with a
+            # different transactional target (for example cancelling TIM Fashion
+            # while Tamboro is awaiting confirmation).  In LLM mode keep the
+            # candidate only as a semantic hint and let the transaction classifier
+            # decide CONTINUE/REPLACE/ABANDON.  Without semantic classification we
+            # retain the legacy state lock because guessing replacement from a
+            # keyword alone would be unsafe.
+            if not different and not (self.enable_llm_router and self.llm is not None):
                 return None
 
             # During parameter collection, a configured keyword may be present in
@@ -1259,6 +1269,11 @@ class EnterpriseRouter:
             "current_intent": started_intent or previous_intent,
             "transaction_status": state.get("transaction_status"),
             "tool_name": active_tx.get("tool_name"),
+            # Structured arguments are part of the identity of the active
+            # transaction.  They let the semantic classifier distinguish a new
+            # instance of the same intent from a continuation without relying on
+            # domain keywords or hard-coded product names.
+            "active_arguments": dict(active_tx.get("arguments") or {}),
             "missing_parameters": list(state.get("missing_parameters") or []),
             "configured_candidate": (
                 {
@@ -1285,11 +1300,15 @@ class EnterpriseRouter:
             )
         else:
             system = (
-                "Você decide apenas se o turno atual continua a transação ativa ou muda de intenção. "
+                "Você decide apenas se o turno atual continua a transação ativa, substitui a instância transacional ativa, "
-                "Use o significado da mensagem e o contexto transacional; não use palavras isoladas como regra. "
+                "ou muda de intenção. Use o significado da mensagem e o contexto transacional; não use palavras isoladas como regra. "
                 "A extração dos parâmetros pendentes já foi tentada antes desta etapa e não consumiu o turno. "
                 "Se ainda assim a mensagem for apenas uma resposta referencial/valor/nome ao dado pendente, retorne CONTINUE. "
-                "Se o usuário passou claramente a perseguir outro objetivo sem desistir explicitamente da ação atual, "
+                "Se o usuário continua com a MESMA intent, mas claramente inicia outra instância da operação com alvo/argumentos diferentes, "
+                "retorne REPLACE e informe a mesma intent e agent. REPLACE significa substituir a transação ativa; não significa estado novo. "
+                "Não use REPLACE quando o usuário apenas complementa/adiciona itens à mesma operação (por exemplo 'também', 'além desses'), "
+                "nem quando apenas reformula ou confirma o mesmo alvo: nesses casos retorne CONTINUE. "
+                "Se o usuário passou claramente a perseguir outro objetivo/intent sem desistir explicitamente da ação atual, "
                 "retorne SHIFT e a nova intent permitida. "
                 "Se o usuário desistiu explicitamente da ação/transação atual, retorne ABANDON. "
                 "Quando ABANDON vier acompanhado de um novo objetivo, também informe intent e agent desse novo objetivo. "
@@ -1323,7 +1342,7 @@ class EnterpriseRouter:
         if abandon_only:
             if decision_kind != "ABANDON":
                 return None
-        elif decision_kind not in {"SHIFT", "ABANDON"}:
+        elif decision_kind not in {"SHIFT", "REPLACE", "ABANDON"}:
             return None
         confidence = float(data.get("confidence") or 0.0)
         if confidence < self.intent_shift_threshold:
@@ -1374,7 +1393,42 @@ class EnterpriseRouter:
                 mcp_tools=mcp_tools,
             )
 
-        if not intent_name or intent_name == (started_intent or previous_intent):
+        current_intent = started_intent or previous_intent
+        if not intent_name:
+            return None
+
+        # Same-intent replacement is a transaction lifecycle event, not a new
+        # conversation state.  It cancels only the active transaction instance
+        # and re-enters normal routing for the same configured intent.
+        if decision_kind == "REPLACE":
+            if not current_intent or intent_name != current_intent:
+                return None
+            agent = agent or str(self._agent_for_intent(intent_name) or "").strip()
+            if not agent:
+                return None
+            return RouteDecision(
+                route=agent,
+                agent=agent,
+                intent=intent_name,
+                confidence=confidence,
+                reason=str(data.get("reason") or "Nova instância transacional da mesma intenção."),
+                method="llm",
+                metadata={
+                    "transaction_interruption": "same_intent_replacement",
+                    "interrupted_state": state_decision.next_state,
+                    "interrupted_agent": state_decision.agent,
+                    "interrupted_intent": current_intent,
+                    "interruption_source": "semantic_classifier",
+                    "configured_routing_hint": (
+                        configured_candidate.intent if configured_candidate is not None else None
+                    ),
+                    "raw_llm_answer": answer[:1000],
+                },
+                domain=self._domain_for_intent(intent_name),
+                mcp_tools=self._tools_for_intent(intent_name),
+            )
+
+        if intent_name == current_intent:
             return None
         agent = agent or str(self._agent_for_intent(intent_name) or "").strip()
         if not agent:

libs/agent_framework/build/lib/agent_framework/runtime/agent_runtime.py

@@ -3113,21 +3113,33 @@ class AgentRuntimeMixin:
         self._normalize_transaction_lifecycle(state)
 
         # Uma transação em coleta/confirmação não pode aprisionar a sessão. O
-        # EnterpriseRouter é a única fonte para interrupção semântica: SHIFT ou
+        # EnterpriseRouter é a única fonte para interrupção semântica: SHIFT,
-        # ABANDON. Não existe interpretação lexical de desistência no runtime; o
+        # ABANDON ou replacement da instância transacional na mesma intent. Não
-        # runtime apenas aplica a decisão do router e limpa os latches da ação.
+        # existe interpretação lexical de desistência no runtime; o runtime apenas
+        # aplica a decisão do router e limpa os latches da ação.
         active_before_interruption = self._active_transaction(state)
         interruption = str(route_meta.get("transaction_interruption") or "").strip().lower()
-        if active_before_interruption and interruption in {"intent_shift", "explicit_abandonment"}:
+        if active_before_interruption and interruption in {
+            "intent_shift",
+            "explicit_abandonment",
+            "same_intent_replacement",
+        }:
             interrupted_tool = active_before_interruption.get("tool_name")
             self._finish_active_transaction(state, "CANCELLED")
             state["transaction_pre_validation"] = None
+            # Generic framework boundary: consumers do not need to know why the
+            # previous transactional context was invalidated.  This deliberately
+            # avoids leaking same_intent_replacement (or any other interruption
+            # subtype) into domain agents/workflows.
+            state["operational_context_reset"] = True
+            if interruption == "explicit_abandonment":
+                action = "cancelled_by_explicit_abandonment"
+            elif interruption == "same_intent_replacement":
+                action = "cancelled_by_same_intent_replacement"
+            else:
+                action = "cancelled_by_intent_shift"
             state["tool_policy_result"] = {
-                "action": (
+                "action": action,
-                    "cancelled_by_explicit_abandonment"
-                    if interruption == "explicit_abandonment"
-                    else "cancelled_by_intent_shift"
-                ),
                 "tool_name": interrupted_tool,
             }
 

libs/agent_framework/src/agent_framework.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ src/agent_framework/guardrails/__init__.py
 src/agent_framework/guardrails/base.py
 src/agent_framework/guardrails/config_loader.py
 src/agent_framework/guardrails/custom_rails.py
+src/agent_framework/guardrails/dlex_sanitizer.py
 src/agent_framework/guardrails/executor.py
 src/agent_framework/guardrails/framework_llm_client.py
 src/agent_framework/guardrails/langgraph_adapters.py

libs/agent_framework/src/agent_framework/guardrails/dlex_sanitizer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+"""Deterministic, framework-owned sanitization for DLEX_OUT.
+
+The DLEX classifier decides whether a candidate response contains information
+that must not be exposed.  When the finding is recoverable, this module masks
+only the sensitive values so the response can be revalidated and preserved.
+
+Rules are intentionally generic and live in the framework, never in domain
+agents. Deployments may extend the built-ins without changing agent code via:
+
+* ``GUARDRAIL_DLEX_OUT_EXTRA_MASKS_JSON`` (JSON list of rule objects), or
+* the DLEX_OUT rail policy key ``sanitize_patterns`` in guardrails.yaml.
+
+Each extension rule accepts ``name``, ``pattern`` and ``replacement``. Patterns
+are regular expressions. Raw matched values are never returned in findings.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from typing import Any, Iterable
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class DlexMaskRule:
+    name: str
+    pattern: str
+    replacement: str
+    flags: int = re.IGNORECASE
+
+
+# Conservative defaults: values that are broadly unsafe to echo verbatim and
+# can be redacted without changing the semantic meaning of an answer.
+_BUILTIN_RULES: tuple[DlexMaskRule, ...] = (
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "payment_barcode",
+        # Brazilian boleto/payment representations normally contain 44, 47 or
+        # 48 digits and may be formatted with dots/spaces. Keep the match on the
+        # numeric token only so surrounding prose is preserved.
+        r"(?<!\d)(?=[0-9.\-\s]{44,90}(?!\d))(?:\d[.\-\s]*){44,48}(?!\d)",
+        "[CODIGO_DE_PAGAMENTO_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "jwt",
+        r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b",
+        "[TOKEN_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "openai_style_secret",
+        r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b",
+        "[CREDENCIAL_OCULTADA]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "labelled_secret",
+        r"(?i)\b(api[_ -]?key|secret|segredo|token|senha|password|credential|credencial)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)([^\s,;]+)",
+        r"\1\2[DADO_PROTEGIDO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "cpf",
+        r"\b\d{3}\.\d{3}\.\d{3}-\d{2}\b",
+        "[CPF_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "cnpj",
+        r"\b\d{2}\.\d{3}\.\d{3}/\d{4}-\d{2}\b",
+        "[CNPJ_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "email",
+        r"\b[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b",
+        "[EMAIL_OCULTADO]",
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "labelled_phone",
+        r"(?i)\b(telefone|celular|whatsapp|msisdn)\b(\s*[:=]?\s*)(?:\+?55\s*)?(?:\(?\d{2}\)?[\s.-]*)?\d{4,5}[\s.-]*\d{4}\b",
+        r"\1\2[TELEFONE_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+    DlexMaskRule(
+        "uuid",
+        r"\b[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[89abAB][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}\b",
+        "[IDENTIFICADOR_OCULTADO]",
+        flags=0,
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def _parse_rule(raw: Any) -> DlexMaskRule | None:
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return None
+    name = str(raw.get("name") or "custom").strip()
+    pattern = str(raw.get("pattern") or "").strip()
+    replacement = str(raw.get("replacement") or "[DADO_PROTEGIDO]")
+    if not pattern:
+        return None
+    try:
+        re.compile(pattern)
+    except re.error:
+        return None
+    return DlexMaskRule(name=name, pattern=pattern, replacement=replacement, flags=0)
+
+
+def _extra_rules_from_env() -> list[DlexMaskRule]:
+    raw = os.getenv("GUARDRAIL_DLEX_OUT_EXTRA_MASKS_JSON", "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return []
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(raw)
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+    if isinstance(data, dict):
+        data = [data]
+    return [rule for item in (data or []) if (rule := _parse_rule(item)) is not None]
+
+
+def _extra_rules_from_policy(policy: dict[str, Any] | None) -> list[DlexMaskRule]:
+    data = dict(policy or {}).get("sanitize_patterns") or []
+    if isinstance(data, dict):
+        data = [data]
+    return [rule for item in data if (rule := _parse_rule(item)) is not None]
+
+
+def _mask_payment_sequences(text: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
+    """Mask 44/47/48-digit payment tokens without consuming surrounding prose.
+
+    Regex alone is awkward because formatted boletos have variable punctuation.
+    We scan numeric/punctuation runs, count digits, and only redact the run when
+    it has a canonical payment digit count.
+    """
+    token_re = re.compile(r"(?<!\d)\d(?:[.\-\s]*\d){43,47}(?!\d)")
+    count = 0
+
+    def repl(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
+        nonlocal count
+        token = match.group(0)
+        digits = re.sub(r"\D", "", token)
+        if len(digits) in {44, 47, 48}:
+            count += 1
+            return "[CODIGO_DE_PAGAMENTO_OCULTADO]"
+        return token
+
+    return token_re.sub(repl, text), count
+
+
+def sanitize_dlex_output(
+    text: str,
+    *,
+    policy: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    exclude_values: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]:
+    """Return ``(sanitized_text, findings)`` without exposing raw matches.
+
+    ``exclude_values`` contains explicitly authorized values (for example a
+    workflow-generated protocol). They are temporarily protected so generic
+    masking never alters them.
+    """
+    original = text or ""
+    sanitized = original
+    findings: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    protected: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for index, value in enumerate(exclude_values or []):
+        value = str(value or "").strip()
+        if not value or value not in sanitized:
+            continue
+        marker = f"__DLEX_AUTHORIZED_{index}__"
+        sanitized = sanitized.replace(value, marker)
+        protected[marker] = value
+
+    # Payment sequences use digit-count validation rather than a plain rule.
+    sanitized, payment_count = _mask_payment_sequences(sanitized)
+    if payment_count:
+        findings.append({"type": "payment_barcode", "action": "redact", "count": payment_count})
+
+    rules = [r for r in _BUILTIN_RULES if r.name != "payment_barcode"]
+    rules.extend(_extra_rules_from_env())
+    rules.extend(_extra_rules_from_policy(policy))
+
+    for rule in rules:
+        try:
+            regex = re.compile(rule.pattern, rule.flags)
+        except re.error:
+            continue
+        sanitized, count = regex.subn(rule.replacement, sanitized)
+        if count:
+            findings.append({"type": rule.name, "action": "redact", "count": count})
+
+    for marker, value in protected.items():
+        sanitized = sanitized.replace(marker, value)
+
+    return sanitized, findings
+
+
+__all__ = ["DlexMaskRule", "sanitize_dlex_output"]

libs/agent_framework/src/agent_framework/guardrails/rails.py

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from .calibrated.output_sanitization import mascarar_pii_output, sanitizar_toxic
 from .calibrated.rules.pinj_patterns import _PINJ_PATTERNS, is_obvious_injection
 from .calibrated.rules.tox_blocklist import _EXPLICIT_TERMS, _THREAT_PATTERNS, is_obvious_toxic
 from .framework_llm_client import classify_with_framework_llm
+from .dlex_sanitizer import sanitize_dlex_output
 from agent_framework.workflows.input_contract import has_meaningful_unmatched_policy, has_semantic_classifier
 
 
@@ -832,11 +833,64 @@ class DataLeakageOutputRail(Guardrail):
                 }
                 protocol_authorization_verified = True
 
+        # DLEX_OUT is permissive for recoverable leakage: when classification
+        # rejects the candidate, mask only generic sensitive values and re-run
+        # the same classifier. The agent/domain remains unaware of this detail.
+        # If sanitization cannot change the candidate, or the sanitized version
+        # is still unsafe, the original blocking behavior is preserved.
+        dlex_sanitized_text = None
+        dlex_findings: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        sanitization_recheck = None
+        original_dlex_result = dict(out)
+        if not bool(out.get("allowed", True)):
+            policy = dict(getattr(self, "_guardrail_policy", {}) or {})
+            candidate_sanitized, dlex_findings = sanitize_dlex_output(
+                original_text,
+                policy=policy,
+                exclude_values=matched_expected_protocols,
+            )
+            if candidate_sanitized != original_text:
+                sanitized_classifier_text = candidate_sanitized
+                sanitized_classifier_ctx: dict[str, Any] = ctx
+                if matched_expected_protocols:
+                    sanitized_classifier_text = _mask_authorized_protocol_values(
+                        sanitized_classifier_text, matched_expected_protocols
+                    )
+                    sanitized_classifier_ctx = _mask_authorized_protocol_values(
+                        ctx, matched_expected_protocols
+                    )
+                sanitization_recheck = await classify_with_framework_llm(
+                    _llm(ctx),
+                    "DLEX_OUT",
+                    {"text": sanitized_classifier_text, "context": sanitized_classifier_ctx},
+                    profile_name="grl",
+                    component_name="guardrail.dlex_out.sanitization_recheck",
+                    generation_name="guardrail.dlex_out.sanitization_recheck",
+                )
+                if bool(sanitization_recheck.get("allowed", True)):
+                    dlex_sanitized_text = candidate_sanitized
+                    out = {
+                        "allowed": True,
+                        "label": "SANITIZED",
+                        "reason": "DLEX_OUT sanitizado e revalidado com segurança",
+                        "original_reason": original_dlex_result.get("reason"),
+                    }
+
         metadata = {
             "mechanism": "llm_rail",
             "data": out,
             "calibrated": True,
         }
+        if dlex_findings:
+            metadata.update(
+                {
+                    "action": "sanitize" if dlex_sanitized_text is not None else "block",
+                    "sanitized": dlex_sanitized_text is not None,
+                    "findings": dlex_findings,
+                    "original_decision": original_dlex_result,
+                    "sanitization_recheck": sanitization_recheck,
+                }
+            )
         if matched_expected_protocols:
             metadata.update(
                 {
@@ -850,7 +904,7 @@ class DataLeakageOutputRail(Guardrail):
             code=self.code,
             allowed=bool(out.get("allowed", True)),
             reason=str(out.get("reason") or out.get("label") or "DLEX_OUT avaliado"),
-            sanitized_text=text,
+            sanitized_text=dlex_sanitized_text,
             metadata=metadata,
         )