M0 + M1 done

RI/tests/unit/test_authn.py

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+"""TokenValidator against a real JWKS HTTP endpoint and real RS256-signed
+tokens (EP-01-T03) -- no Keycloak available in this environment (no Java),
+so a local JWKS server + self-issued tokens exercise the actual OIDC
+validation logic (signature, expiry, issuer, audience) that Keycloak would
+otherwise be the source of. See RI/README.md for what this does and does
+not prove.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import threading
+import time
+from collections.abc import Iterator
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
+from jwt.algorithms import RSAAlgorithm
+
+from emcp_bus.identity.authn import AuthenticationError, TokenValidator
+
+ISSUER = "https://keycloak.example/realms/emcp"
+AUDIENCE = "emcp-gateway"
+KID = "test-key-1"
+
+
+class _JWKSHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    jwks_document: dict[str, object] = {}
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802 -- BaseHTTPRequestHandler's naming convention
+        body = json.dumps(self.jwks_document).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: object) -> None:  # noqa: A002 -- stdlib signature
+        pass  # keep test output quiet
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
+def rsa_keypair() -> tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey]:
+    private_key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
+    return private_key, private_key.public_key()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
+def jwks_server(
+    rsa_keypair: tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey],
+) -> Iterator[str]:
+    _, public_key = rsa_keypair
+    jwk = RSAAlgorithm.to_jwk(public_key, as_dict=True)
+    jwk.update({"kid": KID, "use": "sig", "alg": "RS256"})
+    _JWKSHandler.jwks_document = {"keys": [jwk]}
+
+    server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _JWKSHandler)
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    thread.start()
+    try:
+        yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}/jwks"
+    finally:
+        server.shutdown()
+        thread.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+def _sign_token(
+    private_key: rsa.RSAPrivateKey,
+    *,
+    issuer: str = ISSUER,
+    audience: str = AUDIENCE,
+    client_id: str = "sales-read-agent",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 300,
+    client_id_claim: str = "azp",
+) -> str:
+    now = int(time.time())
+    claims = {
+        "iss": issuer,
+        "aud": audience,
+        "sub": "service-account-sales-read-agent",
+        client_id_claim: client_id,
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + expires_in_seconds,
+    }
+    return jwt.encode(claims, private_key, algorithm="RS256", headers={"kid": KID})
+
+
+def test_valid_token_resolves_the_authenticated_client_id(
+    rsa_keypair: tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey], jwks_server: str
+) -> None:
+    private_key, _ = rsa_keypair
+    token = _sign_token(private_key, client_id="sales-write-agent")
+
+    validator = TokenValidator(jwks_url=jwks_server, issuer=ISSUER, audience=AUDIENCE)
+    authenticated = validator.validate(token)
+
+    assert authenticated.client_id == "sales-write-agent"
+    assert authenticated.issuer == ISSUER
+
+
+def test_client_id_claim_fallback_when_azp_absent(
+    rsa_keypair: tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey], jwks_server: str
+) -> None:
+    private_key, _ = rsa_keypair
+    token = _sign_token(private_key, client_id="sales-write-agent", client_id_claim="client_id")
+
+    validator = TokenValidator(jwks_url=jwks_server, issuer=ISSUER, audience=AUDIENCE)
+    authenticated = validator.validate(token)
+
+    assert authenticated.client_id == "sales-write-agent"
+
+
+def test_expired_token_is_rejected(
+    rsa_keypair: tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey], jwks_server: str
+) -> None:
+    private_key, _ = rsa_keypair
+    token = _sign_token(private_key, expires_in_seconds=-3600)
+
+    validator = TokenValidator(jwks_url=jwks_server, issuer=ISSUER, audience=AUDIENCE)
+    with pytest.raises(AuthenticationError):
+        validator.validate(token)
+
+
+def test_wrong_audience_is_rejected(
+    rsa_keypair: tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey], jwks_server: str
+) -> None:
+    """README.md §45 Teste 8: a token issued for a different resource server must be rejected."""
+    private_key, _ = rsa_keypair
+    token = _sign_token(private_key, audience="some-other-resource-server")
+
+    validator = TokenValidator(jwks_url=jwks_server, issuer=ISSUER, audience=AUDIENCE)
+    with pytest.raises(AuthenticationError):
+        validator.validate(token)
+
+
+def test_wrong_issuer_is_rejected(
+    rsa_keypair: tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey], jwks_server: str
+) -> None:
+    private_key, _ = rsa_keypair
+    token = _sign_token(private_key, issuer="https://attacker.example/realms/fake")
+
+    validator = TokenValidator(jwks_url=jwks_server, issuer=ISSUER, audience=AUDIENCE)
+    with pytest.raises(AuthenticationError):
+        validator.validate(token)
+
+
+def test_token_signed_by_an_untrusted_key_is_rejected(jwks_server: str) -> None:
+    """A different keypair than the one in the JWKS -- e.g. a stolen/forged token."""
+    forged_key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
+    token = _sign_token(forged_key)
+
+    validator = TokenValidator(jwks_url=jwks_server, issuer=ISSUER, audience=AUDIENCE)
+    with pytest.raises(AuthenticationError):
+        validator.validate(token)
+
+
+def test_agent_declared_role_claim_is_never_consulted(
+    rsa_keypair: tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, rsa.RSAPublicKey], jwks_server: str
+) -> None:
+    """README.md §35.1 anti-pattern / Axiom 2: a bonus claim on an otherwise
+    valid token must have zero effect on the resolved client_id."""
+    private_key, _ = rsa_keypair
+    now = int(time.time())
+    claims = {
+        "iss": ISSUER,
+        "aud": AUDIENCE,
+        "sub": "service-account-sales-read-agent",
+        "azp": "sales-read-agent",
+        "role": "finance-admin",  # attacker-controlled-shaped claim, never trusted
+        "iat": now,
+        "exp": now + 300,
+    }
+    token = jwt.encode(claims, private_key, algorithm="RS256", headers={"kid": KID})
+
+    validator = TokenValidator(jwks_url=jwks_server, issuer=ISSUER, audience=AUDIENCE)
+    authenticated = validator.validate(token)
+
+    assert authenticated.client_id == "sales-read-agent"
+    assert not hasattr(authenticated, "role")

RI/tests/unit/test_entitlement_manager.py

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+"""EntitlementManager against real OPA (EP-04-T02/T03/T04), loading the
+actual YAML client profiles/registrations checked into config/ -- not
+hand-built fixtures, so a schema or naming mistake in the YAML itself would
+fail these tests too.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import os
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from emcp_bus.common.config import load_yaml_model, load_yaml_models
+from emcp_bus.common.models import RiskTier
+from emcp_bus.entitlement.manager import EntitlementManager, UnknownClientError
+from emcp_bus.entitlement.models import ClientProfile
+from emcp_bus.identity.models import ClientRegistration
+from emcp_bus.pdp.client import PDPClient, compute_policy_version
+
+REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[2]
+POLICIES_DIR = REPO_ROOT / "config" / "policies"
+PROFILES_DIR = REPO_ROOT / "config" / "clients" / "profiles"
+CLIENTS_DIR = REPO_ROOT / "config" / "clients"
+
+
+def _free_port() -> int:
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
+        s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+        return int(s.getsockname()[1])
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+async def entitlement_manager() -> AsyncIterator[EntitlementManager]:
+    opa_binary = shutil.which(os.environ.get("OPA_BINARY", "opa"))
+    if opa_binary is None:
+        pytest.skip(
+            "opa binary not found on PATH (set OPA_BINARY or install it -- see RI/README.md)"
+        )
+
+    port = _free_port()
+    process = subprocess.Popen(
+        [opa_binary, "run", "--server", "--addr", f"127.0.0.1:{port}", str(POLICIES_DIR)],
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    )
+    pdp = PDPClient(
+        base_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}",
+        policy_version=compute_policy_version(POLICIES_DIR),
+    )
+    try:
+        for _ in range(100):
+            try:
+                await pdp._http.get("/health")
+                break
+            except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+                await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
+        else:
+            raise RuntimeError("opa server did not become healthy in time")
+
+        manager = EntitlementManager(pdp)
+        manager.load_registrations(
+            [
+                load_yaml_model(path, ClientRegistration)
+                for path in sorted(CLIENTS_DIR.glob("*.yaml"))
+            ]
+        )
+        manager.load_profiles(load_yaml_models(PROFILES_DIR, ClientProfile))
+        await manager.sync_profiles_to_pdp()
+        yield manager
+    finally:
+        await pdp.aclose()
+        process.terminate()
+        process.wait(timeout=5)
+
+
+async def test_resolves_sales_read_exactly_as_readme_7_1(
+    entitlement_manager: EntitlementManager,
+) -> None:
+    resolved = entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-read-agent")
+
+    assert resolved.profile_name == "Sales.Read"
+    assert resolved.risk_ceiling is RiskTier.R1
+    assert resolved.allowed_tools == frozenset(
+        {
+            "sales.customer.search",
+            "sales.customer.get",
+            "sales.order.get",
+            "sales.inventory.check",
+        }
+    )
+    assert resolved.entitlement_version
+
+
+async def test_sales_write_does_not_include_approve_tools(
+    entitlement_manager: EntitlementManager,
+) -> None:
+    resolved = entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-write-agent")
+
+    assert "sales.quote.create" in resolved.allowed_tools
+    assert "sales.discount.approve" not in resolved.allowed_tools
+    assert "finance.createPayment" not in resolved.allowed_tools
+
+
+async def test_unknown_client_id_raises() -> None:
+    pdp = PDPClient(base_url="http://127.0.0.1:1", policy_version="dev")
+    manager = EntitlementManager(pdp)
+    try:
+        with pytest.raises(UnknownClientError):
+            manager.resolve("no-such-client")
+    finally:
+        await pdp.aclose()
+
+
+async def test_revoke_client_forces_re_resolution_to_fail(
+    entitlement_manager: EntitlementManager,
+) -> None:
+    entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-read-agent")  # populate cache
+    assert entitlement_manager.cached("sales-read-agent") is not None
+
+    entitlement_manager.revoke_client("sales-read-agent")
+
+    assert entitlement_manager.cached("sales-read-agent") is None
+    with pytest.raises(UnknownClientError):
+        entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-read-agent")
+
+
+async def test_revoke_profile_invalidates_cache_for_all_its_clients(
+    entitlement_manager: EntitlementManager,
+) -> None:
+    entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-read-agent")
+    assert entitlement_manager.cached("sales-read-agent") is not None
+
+    entitlement_manager.revoke_profile("Sales.Read")
+
+    assert entitlement_manager.cached("sales-read-agent") is None
+    # Registration itself is untouched -- the *next* resolve() recomputes
+    # cleanly against whatever profile is currently loaded (RF-08).
+    resolved_again = entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-read-agent")
+    assert resolved_again.profile_name == "Sales.Read"
+
+
+async def test_entitlement_version_changes_when_profile_content_changes(
+    entitlement_manager: EntitlementManager,
+) -> None:
+    before = entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-read-agent").entitlement_version
+
+    mutated = ClientProfile.model_validate(
+        {
+            "name": "Sales.Read",
+            "owner": "sales-platform",
+            "risk_ceiling": "R1",
+            "allowed_tools": ["sales.customer.get", "sales.order.get", "sales.inventory.check"],
+        }
+    )
+    entitlement_manager.load_profiles([mutated])
+
+    after = entitlement_manager.resolve("sales-read-agent").entitlement_version
+
+    assert before != after

RI/tests/unit/test_pdp_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+"""PDPClient against a *real* OPA process (EP-03-T01/T04) -- not a mock.
+
+Requires the `opa` binary on PATH (or `OPA_BINARY` pointing at it); skips
+otherwise. See RI/README.md for install instructions -- OPA ships as a
+single static binary, no Docker required.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import os
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from emcp_bus.pdp.client import PDPClient, PDPUnavailableError, compute_policy_version
+from emcp_bus.pdp.models import PDPOutcome
+
+POLICIES_DIR = Path(__file__).parents[2] / "config" / "policies"
+
+
+def _opa_binary() -> str | None:
+    return shutil.which(os.environ.get("OPA_BINARY", "opa"))
+
+
+def _free_port() -> int:
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
+        s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+        return int(s.getsockname()[1])
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+async def pdp_client() -> AsyncIterator[PDPClient]:
+    opa_binary = _opa_binary()
+    if opa_binary is None:
+        pytest.skip(
+            "opa binary not found on PATH (set OPA_BINARY or install it -- see RI/README.md)"
+        )
+
+    port = _free_port()
+    process = subprocess.Popen(
+        [opa_binary, "run", "--server", "--addr", f"127.0.0.1:{port}", str(POLICIES_DIR)],
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    )
+    client = PDPClient(
+        base_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}",
+        policy_version=compute_policy_version(POLICIES_DIR),
+    )
+    try:
+        for _ in range(100):
+            try:
+                await client._http.get("/health")
+                break
+            except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 -- retry loop, any error means "not ready yet"
+                await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
+        else:
+            raise RuntimeError("opa server did not become healthy in time")
+        yield client
+    finally:
+        await client.aclose()
+        process.terminate()
+        process.wait(timeout=5)
+
+
+async def test_policy_version_is_stable_and_nonempty() -> None:
+    version = compute_policy_version(POLICIES_DIR)
+    assert version
+    assert version == compute_policy_version(POLICIES_DIR)
+
+
+async def test_deny_when_tool_not_in_entitlement(pdp_client: PDPClient) -> None:
+    await pdp_client.push_client_profile("Sales.Read", {"allowed_tools": ["sales.customer.get"]})
+
+    decision = await pdp_client.evaluate(client_profile="Sales.Read", tool="finance.createPayment")
+
+    assert decision.outcome is PDPOutcome.DENY
+    assert decision.reason_code == "NOT_IN_ENTITLEMENT"
+    assert decision.policy_version
+
+
+async def test_allow_when_tool_in_entitlement_and_within_transaction_limits(
+    pdp_client: PDPClient,
+) -> None:
+    await pdp_client.push_client_profile(
+        "Sales.Write",
+        {
+            "allowed_tools": ["sales.quote.create"],
+            "restrictions": {"max_transaction_value": 500000, "approval_threshold": 100000},
+        },
+    )
+
+    decision = await pdp_client.evaluate(
+        client_profile="Sales.Write",
+        tool="sales.quote.create",
+        arguments={"amount": 50000},
+    )
+
+    assert decision.outcome is PDPOutcome.ALLOW
+    assert decision.reason_code == "ALLOWED"
+
+
+async def test_deny_when_transaction_exceeds_limit_even_though_entitled(
+    pdp_client: PDPClient,
+) -> None:
+    await pdp_client.push_client_profile(
+        "Sales.Write",
+        {
+            "allowed_tools": ["sales.quote.create"],
+            "restrictions": {"max_transaction_value": 500000},
+        },
+    )
+
+    decision = await pdp_client.evaluate(
+        client_profile="Sales.Write",
+        tool="sales.quote.create",
+        arguments={"amount": 999999},
+    )
+
+    assert decision.outcome is PDPOutcome.DENY
+    assert decision.reason_code == "TRANSACTION_POLICY_DENIED"
+
+
+async def test_require_approval_above_threshold(pdp_client: PDPClient) -> None:
+    await pdp_client.push_client_profile(
+        "Finance.Payments",
+        {
+            "allowed_tools": ["finance.payment.execute"],
+            "restrictions": {"max_transaction_value": 10_000_000, "approval_threshold": 10_000},
+        },
+    )
+
+    decision = await pdp_client.evaluate(
+        client_profile="Finance.Payments",
+        tool="finance.payment.execute",
+        arguments={"amount": 15_000},
+    )
+
+    assert decision.outcome is PDPOutcome.REQUIRE_APPROVAL
+    assert decision.reason_code == "APPROVAL_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDED"
+
+
+async def test_fails_closed_when_opa_is_unreachable() -> None:
+    unreachable_port = _free_port()  # nothing listening here
+    client = PDPClient(base_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{unreachable_port}", policy_version="dev")
+    try:
+        with pytest.raises(PDPUnavailableError):
+            await client.evaluate(client_profile="Sales.Read", tool="sales.customer.get")
+    finally:
+        await client.aclose()

RI/tests/unit/test_schemas.py

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+"""Sanity checks for the M1 config schemas (EP-01-T02, EP-02-T01, EP-04-T01)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from pydantic import ValidationError
+
+from emcp_bus.common.models import RiskTier, risk_tier_at_or_below
+from emcp_bus.entitlement.models import ClientProfile
+from emcp_bus.identity.models import ClientRegistration
+from emcp_bus.registry.models import BackendRef, CapabilityManifest
+
+
+def test_risk_tier_ordering() -> None:
+    assert risk_tier_at_or_below(RiskTier.R1, RiskTier.R2)
+    assert not risk_tier_at_or_below(RiskTier.R3, RiskTier.R2)
+    assert risk_tier_at_or_below(RiskTier.R0, RiskTier.R0)
+
+
+def test_client_profile_from_readme_example() -> None:
+    profile = ClientProfile.model_validate(
+        {
+            "name": "Sales.Write",
+            "owner": "sales-platform",
+            "environment": "production",
+            "risk_ceiling": "R2",
+            "allowed_tools": [
+                "sales.customer.get",
+                "sales.order.get",
+                "sales.quote.create",
+                "sales.quote.update",
+            ],
+            "restrictions": {"max_transaction_value": 500000},
+            "credential_policy": {"workload_identity": True, "short_lived": True},
+            "audit": {"level": "full"},
+        }
+    )
+    assert profile.risk_ceiling is RiskTier.R2
+    assert "sales.quote.create" in profile.allowed_tools
+
+
+def test_client_profile_rejects_flat_name() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        ClientProfile.model_validate(
+            {
+                "name": "SalesWrite",  # missing "<Domain>.<Qualifier>"
+                "owner": "sales-platform",
+                "risk_ceiling": "R2",
+                "allowed_tools": ["sales.quote.create"],
+            }
+        )
+
+
+def test_client_registration_references_a_profile_by_name() -> None:
+    registration = ClientRegistration.model_validate(
+        {"client_id": "sales-write-agent", "profile": "Sales.Write"}
+    )
+    assert registration.profile == "Sales.Write"
+
+
+def test_capability_manifest_domain_must_prefix_name() -> None:
+    manifest = CapabilityManifest.model_validate(
+        {
+            "name": "sales.quote.create",
+            "version": "2.1.0",
+            "domain": "sales",
+            "owner": "sales-platform",
+            "risk_tier": "R2",
+            "side_effects": True,
+            "idempotent": False,
+            "entitlements": ["Sales.Write", "Sales.Approve"],
+            "backend": {"type": "mcp", "service": "sales-domain"},
+        }
+    )
+    assert manifest.backend == BackendRef(type="mcp", service="sales-domain")
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+        CapabilityManifest.model_validate(
+            {
+                "name": "sales.quote.create",
+                "version": "2.1.0",
+                "domain": "finance",  # mismatched prefix
+                "owner": "sales-platform",
+                "risk_tier": "R2",
+                "side_effects": True,
+                "idempotent": False,
+                "entitlements": ["Sales.Write"],
+                "backend": {"type": "mcp", "service": "sales-domain"},
+            }
+        )