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Improve Deep Data Security lab scenarios
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Rodrigo
2026-05-13 16:11:12 -03:00
parent 8314351c98
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scenarios/01-ai-prompt-injection/evidence/expected-results.md Normal file → Executable file
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# Expected Results
- `alice` sees only customers where `account_owner = alice`.
- `bruno` sees LATAM customers and `tax_id` as `NULL`.
- `carla` sees global rows and sensitive columns.
- The same broad SQL returns different results by end-user context.
- Before DDS enforcement, `alice` can run the broad high-risk customer query through the intentionally overprivileged legacy role.
- Before DDS enforcement, sensitive columns such as `tax_id` and `annual_revenue` may be exposed to Alice.
- After DDS enforcement, `alice` sees only LATAM customer fields authorized for the sales role.
- After DDS enforcement, `bruno` sees LATAM customers and `tax_id` as `NULL`.
- After DDS enforcement, `carla` sees global rows and sensitive columns.
- The same broad SQL returns different results after database-enforced data grants are applied.