# Workshop - Prevent View Bypass With Oracle Deep Data Security

## About This Workshop

This workshop demonstrates why access rules should be enforced on the protected data, not only in application SQL or views. Before DDS, a legacy view can expose accounts outside the user's ownership. After DDS, the base table and alternate access paths respect the same boundary.

## Workshop Goals

- Create an account table and a legacy view.
- Show how a view can become an alternate access path.
- Apply DDS to enforce account ownership at the table boundary.
- Validate that table and view access return the same authorized subset.

## Estimated Time

20 to 30 minutes.

## Scenario Summary

| Persona | Business Role | Expected Access After DDS |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `emma` | Account owner | Only accounts owned by Emma. |
| `marvin` | Account owner | Only accounts owned by Marvin. |
| `erik` | Account owner | Only accounts owned by Erik. |

## Before You Begin

```bash
cd <repo-root>
export TNS_ADMIN=<wallet-directory>
sql admin@ddslab_tunnel
```

SQLcl note: after running `@file.sql`, do not type `/`.


Connection alias note: ddslab_tunnel is the TNS alias configured in the wallet `tnsnames.ora` for this lab. If your wallet uses another alias, replace ddslab_tunnel with your own service alias.

## Lab 1 - Prepare The Environment

### Task 1.1 - Reset The Scenario

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/99_reset.sql
```

### Task 1.2 - Create Table And View

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/00_schema.sql
```

The script creates:

| Object | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `DDS_MAC_ACCOUNTS` | Protected base account table. |
| `DDS_MAC_ACCOUNTS_VIEW` | Legacy view over the base table. |

### Task 1.3 - Load Accounts

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/01_seed_data.sql
```

Example accounts include owners `emma`, `marvin`, and `erik`.

### Task 1.4 - Create Personas And Roles

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/02_identities.sql
```

The script creates:

```sql
CREATE END USER emma IDENTIFIED BY "Welcome1_DDS!";
CREATE END USER marvin IDENTIFIED BY "Welcome1_DDS!";
CREATE END USER erik IDENTIFIED BY "Welcome1_DDS!";
CREATE DATA ROLE account_owner_role;
```

## Lab 2 - Demonstrate The View Bypass Risk

### Task 2.1 - Connect As Emma Before DDS

Exit the administrator session:

```sql
exit
```

Connect as Emma:

```bash
sql 'emma/Welcome1_DDS!@ddslab_tunnel'
```

Emma represents an account owner. Before DDS enforcement, she still has a broad legacy role, so this section demonstrates why view-based controls and object grants can be risky.

### Task 2.2 - Query The Base Table Directly Before DDS

```sql
ALTER SESSION SET CURRENT_SCHEMA = ADMIN;

SELECT account_id, account_name, owner_name, region, balance
FROM dds_mac_accounts
ORDER BY account_id;
```

Expected result before DDS: Emma can see `Account Alpha`, `Account Beta`, and `Account Gamma`, even though only `Account Alpha` belongs to her.

This is the direct table access path.

### Task 2.3 - Query The Legacy View Before DDS

```sql
SELECT account_id, account_name, owner_name, region, balance
FROM dds_mac_accounts_view
ORDER BY account_id;
```

Expected result before DDS: the view also returns accounts owned by multiple users.

This is the alternate access path. The important point is not that the view itself is bad; the risk is relying on a specific access path as the only security boundary.

### Customer Message

Before DDS, Emma can reach the same overexposed data through both paths:

```text
Direct table query -> all accounts
Legacy view query  -> all accounts
```

The business rule "Emma should only see Emma's account" is not being enforced at the protected data boundary yet.

## Lab 3 - Apply Oracle Deep Data Security

### Task 3.1 - Reconnect As ADMIN

```sql
exit
```

```bash
sql admin@ddslab_tunnel
```

### Task 3.2 - Apply Data Grants

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/03_data_grants.sql
```

The main grant is:

```sql
CREATE OR REPLACE DATA GRANT mac_account_owner
  AS SELECT
  ON dds_mac_accounts
  WHERE owner_name = ORA_END_USER_CONTEXT.username
  TO account_owner_role;
```

This filters accounts to the authenticated owner. The script enables DDS on `DDS_MAC_ACCOUNTS`.

In this lab, the predicate compares the account owner with the active DDS end-user context:

```sql
WHERE UPPER(owner_name) = ORA_END_USER_CONTEXT.username
```

That means Emma, Marvin, and Erik can run the same SQL, but the database returns different rows for each persona.

## Lab 4 - Validate Table And View Access

### Task 4.1 - Test Emma After DDS

```sql
exit
```

```bash
sql 'emma/Welcome1_DDS!@ddslab_tunnel'
```

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/04_test_queries.sql
```

Expected result: Emma sees only `Account Alpha` from both table and view paths.

The same two access paths are tested again:

```text
Direct table query -> only Account Alpha
Legacy view query  -> only Account Alpha
```

The SQL did not become smarter. The database security boundary became mandatory.

### Task 4.2 - Quick Validation With Marvin

```sql
exit
```

```bash
sql 'marvin/Welcome1_DDS!@ddslab_tunnel'
```

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/04_test_queries.sql
```

Expected result: Marvin sees only `Account Beta` from both paths.

### Task 4.3 - Quick Validation With Erik

```sql
exit
```

```bash
sql 'erik/Welcome1_DDS!@ddslab_tunnel'
```

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/04_test_queries.sql
```

Expected result: Erik sees only `Account Gamma` from both paths.

### Customer Message

After DDS, the result is consistent regardless of the path:

```text
Emma   -> Account Alpha only
Marvin -> Account Beta only
Erik   -> Account Gamma only
```

This shows the value of DDS versus relying only on view logic, application SQL, BI filters, or agent-generated SQL.

## Lab 5 - Clean Up

```sql
exit
```

```bash
sql admin@ddslab_tunnel
```

```sql
@scenarios/04-view-bypass-mac/sql/99_reset.sql
exit
```

## What You Built

| Component | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `DDS_MAC_ACCOUNTS` | Protected base table. |
| `DDS_MAC_ACCOUNTS_VIEW` | Legacy view used to demonstrate alternate access paths. |
| `END USER` | `emma`, `marvin`, `erik`; account owner personas. |
| `DATA ROLE` | `account_owner_role`; owner authorization profile. |
| `DATA GRANT` | Filters rows by `owner_name = ORA_END_USER_CONTEXT.username`. |
| `SET USE DATA GRANTS ONLY` | Enforces DDS on the base table. |

The trust chain is: **end-user identity -> account owner role -> owner data grant -> protected table access**.

## Product Manager Talking Points

- Views are useful, but they should not be the only security boundary.
- DDS protects the data regardless of the access path.
- This reduces bypass risk from direct SQL, legacy views, and reporting tools.